Protecting Te Tiriti · Evidence Series · Part 14
Matike Mai: protection or constitutional transformation?
Matike Mai Aotearoa is not principally a proposal to protect Te Tiriti more securely inside the existing Westminster constitution. Its stated task was to develop a different constitutionalism grounded in tikanga and kawa, He Wakaputanga, Te Tiriti and recognised indigenous-rights instruments. Its dominant conceptual move is to treat rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga as constitutionally distinct spheres of authority, with shared matters dealt with through a relational sphere. But the 2016 report is not a constitution, not legislation, and not an adjudication of the sovereignty dispute: it deliberately proceeds from specified Māori constitutional premises and offers six indicative models for further discussion.
Matike Mai report 2016Six indicative modelsMethodology boundary2026 Mātike Mai Fund proposal
This part audits Matike Mai on its own terms. It does not assume its constitutional premises are legally operative merely because the report states them, and it does not treat the Crown's current doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as proof that those premises are historically wrong. The report's design project, its evidential premises and its current legal status are kept separate.
1. Start with the actual terms of reference
Matike Mai Aotearoa was first promoted through the Iwi Chairs' Forum in 2010. The Independent Working Group was chaired by Professor Margaret Mutu and convened by Moana Jackson. Its terms of reference required it to develop and implement a model for an inclusive constitution based on tikanga and kawa, He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Niu Tireni, Te Tiriti o Waitangi and indigenous human-rights instruments with wide international recognition.
The report then makes a decisive distinction. It says the Working Group was not asked how the Treaty might fit within the existing Westminster constitutional system. It was asked to seek advice on a different type of constitutionalism based on He Wakaputanga and Te Tiriti. That is why it uses the expression constitutional transformation rather than constitutional change.
Matike Mai is structurally different from entrenching Te Tiriti, strengthening Treaty clauses or creating stronger judicial remedies inside the present parliamentary constitution. Its brief begins at the level of constitutional architecture itself.
2. Its process was substantial — but its mandate still has to be described accurately
The Working Group says its chair and convenor facilitated 252 hui between 2012 and 2015, while the rangatahi group presented 70 wānanga. It also received written submissions, held focus groups and conducted interviews.
That gives the report a substantial Māori engagement base. It does not make the report a referendum, an enacted constitution, a nationwide legal mandate from every hapū, or a binding decision of all Māori. The report itself describes its work as part of an ongoing dialogue and says further work and wider discussion are required.
Strong engagement record
Hundreds of hui and wānanga, written submissions, focus groups and interviews informed the report.
Not a final constitutional mandate
The process generated a report and indicative models, not a legally ratified constitution binding every affected constitutional actor.
3. The most important evidence boundary is stated by the Working Group itself
The report says participants regarded tikanga, He Wakaputanga, Te Tiriti and indigenous-rights instruments as fundamentally relevant because they expressed the right of Māori to make decisions for Māori — the essence of tino rangatiratanga.
It then expressly says that it does not consider the Crown's contrary sovereignty view in great detail. The Working Group records that its terms of reference were based on Māori understandings and that it proceeded on that basis. Elsewhere it says the brief makes presumptions about He Wakaputanga, Te Tiriti and constitutions that are contested by the Crown, and that the Working Group accepts those presumptions as givens while offering its reasons for doing so.
Matike Mai is a constitutional-design inquiry working from declared Māori constitutional premises. It should not be presented as if it independently heard and adjudicated both the Māori non-cession case and the Crown sovereignty case and then issued a neutral legal ruling between them.
4. That does not make the report irrelevant to the sovereignty evidence
The methodology boundary cuts both ways. Because Matike Mai intentionally proceeds from Māori understandings, its statements about sovereignty cannot substitute for the historical audit undertaken elsewhere in this series. But its constitutional models remain highly relevant once a separate evidential inquiry identifies a genuine conflict between retained rangatiratanga and the later doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.
Part 13 established exactly that distinction: the modern Parliament has a traceable institutional genealogy, while that genealogy does not itself prove the content of Māori consent in 1840. Matike Mai asks what constitutional architecture might follow if rangatiratanga is treated as a continuing source of authority rather than merely an interest administered within Crown law.
5. Matike Mai did not produce one replacement constitution
The report is explicit that its models are indicative. They indicate a range of possibilities. They require further detailed consideration, including structural, procedural and financial work, and the report allows that later discussions could produce an entirely different model.
Six models are identified:
| Model | Basic architecture | Constitutional significance |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Iwi/Hapū assembly, Crown in Parliament, and a joint deliberative body. | Distinct rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga spheres plus a national relational sphere. |
| 2 | Iwi/Hapū plus other Māori representation including urban Māori authorities, Crown in Parliament, and joint body. | Broadens representation within the rangatiratanga and relational spheres. |
| 3 | Iwi/Hapū assembly, Crown in Parliament, and regional relational assemblies. | Locates joint decision-making regionally rather than through one national joint body. |
| 4 | Rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga spheres plus direct Iwi/Hapū/Crown relationships and a broader relational assembly. | Uses a multi-sphere structure to preserve direct relationships alongside broader joint deliberation. |
| 5 | Iwi/Hapū and Crown together in one constitutionally mandated assembly. | Only a relational sphere; no separate rangatiratanga or kāwanatanga chamber. |
| 6 | Iwi/Hapū assembly and Crown in Parliament. | Distinct rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga spheres but no separate relational sphere. |
Matike Mai is often reduced to “the three-spheres model”. Three spheres are central to much of the report, but the report actually presents six indicative arrangements, including a one-sphere relational model and a two-sphere bicameral model.
6. The recurring constitutional move is still unmistakable
Although the six models differ, the report says the constitutional vision generally crystallised around distinct rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga authority and a place for joint decision-making. It identifies one of the most important refinements as placing the relational sphere and overarching constitution upon values drawn from tikanga Māori while recognising the integrity and independence of rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga.
This is not simply a stronger consultation model. It changes where constitutional authority is located.
Protection inside Westminster
Parliament remains the ultimate legal authority but is more strongly constrained by Treaty duties, courts, entrenchment or institutional process.
Matike Mai transformation
Constitutional authority is reconceived so rangatiratanga is not merely a Crown-recognised interest subordinate to Parliament, and shared matters require a separate constitutional relationship.
7. The report's description of rangatiratanga makes the difference explicit
Near the end of the constitutional-vision section, the report says rangatiratanga should become a constitutional site in its own right rather than merely a means of accessing or limiting Crown policy. It envisages rangatiratanga being exercised as authority within its own sphere and describes it as independent rather than subject to the power of another, while remaining constrained by tikanga and relationships with others.
That is the decisive line between ordinary Treaty protection and constitutional transformation. A legal duty requiring the Crown to consider rangatiratanga still places the operative decision within Crown law. Matike Mai's stronger models instead ask what follows if rangatiratanga itself is constitutionally operative.
8. Kāwanatanga is also retained — but reconceived
Matike Mai does not propose that all Crown or general governmental authority simply disappears. The report says kāwanatanga could continue in its own sphere, drawing from its Westminster history, but no longer be conceived as an indivisible and unchallengeable dominating power.
That point matters. The report's core project is not accurately described as replacing one monopoly with another. Its dominant architecture seeks to allocate authority and create constitutional relationships between distinct sources or spheres of decision-making.
9. The report therefore goes beyond “co-governance” as that term is usually used
Co-governance normally describes a particular institution or resource in which Crown and Māori actors share defined governance functions. Matike Mai works at a higher constitutional level. It asks where authority itself sits across the political order.
Some relational-sphere arrangements would plainly involve joint decision-making. But the report also contemplates decisions made separately within rangatiratanga and kāwanatanga spheres. Calling the whole project merely “co-governance” therefore understates what it proposes.
10. Matike Mai is not current New Zealand law
No provision in the 2016 report itself reallocates jurisdiction under current domestic law. The report is not an Act of Parliament, a binding court judgment or an enacted constitution.
Its six models therefore describe proposed constitutional possibilities. They do not presently displace section 15 of the Constitution Act 1986, under which Parliament continues to have full power to make laws.
Matike Mai may be constitutionally important as a Māori-led design project and statement of constitutional aspiration. That is different from saying its spheres presently possess the domestic legal powers the models contemplate.
11. The report's own recommendations were process recommendations
The final recommendations called for continuing discussion among iwi, hapū and Māori organisations, a Māori Constitutional Convention, further work on structural and procedural questions, dialogue with other communities, and formal dialogue with the Crown and local authorities. It also proposed a later Tiriti Convention involving Māori and the Crown.
Those recommendations confirm that the 2016 report was designed as a platform for a continuing constitutional process rather than a finished constitution ready to commence automatically.
12. The later Matike Mai kaupapa continues to describe the destination as transformation
The current Matike Mai website's Te Kawenata commits to advancing constitutional transformation based on the report's values. It advocates a multi-sphere constitutional structure, hapū and iwi assemblies adjacent to the Crown in Parliament, direct constitutionally mandated relationships and a relational sphere. It also states an aspiration to realise constitutional transformation by 2040.
This later kaupapa is consistent with the report's transformative frame rather than a narrow project of adding Treaty clauses to the existing constitutional structure.
13. The 2026 Mātike Mai Fund is a separate political proposal
On 1 September 2026 Te Pāti Māori announced a Te Tiriti Entrenchment Policy that includes a proposed $220 million Mātike Mai Fund over four years. The party says the fund would independently resource Māori-led constitutional transformation and sets 2040 as the target. The same policy also proposes an independent Te Tiriti Commission, binding Waitangi Tribunal recommendations and a renewed UN Declaration implementation plan.
The party expressly says it will not determine the constitutional destination and describes its role as resourcing iwi, hapū and Māori to lead the conversation while creating space for tangata Tiriti, local government and the Crown to participate. Contemporary reporting says the proposed fund would resource an independent secretariat, constitutional kōrero, another independent working group and a Māori Constitutional Convention.
The proposed fund is not the 2016 Matike Mai report and the 2016 report is not a Te Pāti Māori policy document. One is an independent constitutional-design report; the other is a 2026 party policy proposing public funding and new legal institutions to advance a constitutional process.
14. “Independent” now needs a governance audit, not just a label
If public money is used to resource an independent constitutional process, the independence design becomes constitutionally important. The current policy material states the objective, but a final governance instrument would need to answer operational questions before independence could be verified.
| Audit question | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Who legally holds and administers the fund? | Determines whether control sits with a Minister, department, statutory entity, trust, independent secretariat or another body. |
| Who appoints the secretariat and working group? | Appointment power can determine whether political actors indirectly control the process. |
| Who qualifies for funding? | Hapū, iwi, urban Māori, rangatahi, constitutional experts and other communities may have different mandates and resource needs. |
| Can hapū access resources directly? | A process grounded in hapū authority should not silently require all participation to pass through larger Crown-recognised organisations. |
| What are the conflict and transparency rules? | Large constitutional funding requires published criteria, auditability, conflict management and disclosure. |
| Can the funder influence the constitutional destination? | True process independence requires protection against conditions that predetermine acceptable models. |
| How are expert and contrary views tested? | A constitutional process needs evidence-testing capacity, including legal, historical, tikanga, economic and institutional scrutiny rather than political endorsement alone. |
| How and when do tangata Tiriti and the wider public participate? | An inclusive national constitution requires a transparent pathway from Māori constitutional deliberation into wider constitutional dialogue and consent. |
15. The Government has not adopted Matike Mai
The current political position should also be kept precise. In Parliament on 1 September 2026, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said he did not believe he had read the Matike Mai report when Rawiri Waititi asked what recommendations the Government would progress.
That is a useful status control. Matike Mai is an active Māori constitutional kaupapa and is now the subject of a major Te Pāti Māori election policy, but it is not presently the constitutional programme of the incumbent Government.
16. The finding for this series
The evidence supports a clear conclusion: Matike Mai is a project of constitutional transformation, not merely a project of protecting Te Tiriti inside the existing Westminster constitutional order.
Its central constitutional move is to treat rangatiratanga as capable of existing as an operative authority rather than only as a right, interest or principle interpreted by the Crown's institutions. In its dominant models, kāwanatanga also has integrity in its own sphere and shared matters are dealt with through constitutionally structured relationships.
But three limits are equally important. First, the report is not current law. Second, it provides six indicative models rather than one final constitution. Third, it deliberately works from Māori constitutional premises and does not purport to adjudicate the competing Crown sovereignty case from a neutral starting point.
The new 2026 Mātike Mai Fund proposal therefore raises a different question from whether Matike Mai is transformative. It plainly is. The live audit is whether a publicly funded process can remain genuinely Māori-led, evidence-tested and independent — and whether its eventual constitutional mandate would come from the people and authorities it affects rather than from the political party that funds the process.
Entrenchment protects rules inside an existing constitutional order. Matike Mai asks whether the constitutional order itself should be rebuilt so that rangatiratanga is a source of authority rather than merely something Parliament promises to protect. Those are fundamentally different projects, even though Te Tiriti is central to both.
Primary and current sources
Matike Mai Aotearoa — He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, full 2016 report ↗
Matike Mai Aotearoa — official background, terms of reference and engagement process ↗
Matike Mai Aotearoa — Te Kawenata and current multi-sphere transformation commitment ↗
Te Pāti Māori — 1 September 2026 Te Tiriti Entrenchment Policy and proposed $220m Mātike Mai Fund ↗
Te Ao Māori News — reported proposed fund architecture and current political responses ↗
Hansard — 1 September 2026, Rawiri Waititi asks the Prime Minister about Matike Mai ↗