KIRI CAMPBELL

Nu Tireni · Evidence Series · Part 38 · Status & Jurisdiction Audit

Who were the “inhabitants” of the Colony of New Zealand?

Queen Victoria’s 1840 Charter does not use one legal label for everyone living in New Zealand. It speaks separately of “our subjects there resident”, the “Aboriginal Natives”, and “all other the Inhabitants” of the colony. Those expressions should not be collapsed into one another.

Primary instrumentStatus distinctionJurisdiction audit

The Charter uses three different descriptions

The Charter of 16 November 1840 erected New Zealand as a separate British colony and created the machinery through which the Crown intended the Governor to act. Within the same instrument, the Crown used materially different descriptions for people connected with the territory.

“our subjects there resident”

The land-grant clause allowed grants in trust for public uses benefiting the Crown’s subjects resident in the colony.

“Aboriginal Natives”

The land-rights proviso expressly protected the actual occupation or enjoyment of land by the Aboriginal Natives and their descendants.

“all other the Inhabitants”

The obedience clause commanded Crown officers and ministers, and all other inhabitants of the colony, to be obedient, aiding and assisting to the Governor.

Drafting controlThe instrument knew how to say “subjects” when it meant subjects and “Aboriginal Natives” when it meant the Indigenous population specifically. Its use of the broader word “inhabitants” in the obedience clause therefore should not automatically be rewritten as “British subjects”.

Who did “inhabitants” include?

On its ordinary territorial reading, “inhabitants” was the broadest category: people living within the geographical area the Crown had declared to be the Colony of New Zealand. That would encompass the Aboriginal Native population and resident settlers, including people who were not British subjects.

The later naturalisation legislation helps prove the distinction. The Naturalization Act 1845 dealt with people who had settled in the colony but remained legally subject to the disabilities imposed on aliens. It then deemed named settlers to be natural-born subjects. A person could therefore live in the colony — and be an inhabitant or resident — without already being a British subject.

ExpressionWhat the text supportsWhat it does not prove by itself
SubjectA legal status of allegiance recognised by British law.That every inhabitant automatically fell within that category merely because the Charter called the territory a colony.
Aboriginal NativeThe Charter’s specific description for the Indigenous people whose existing occupation and enjoyment of land it preserved.That “Aboriginal Native” was merely another drafting synonym for “British subject”.
InhabitantA broad territorial description capable of including everyone living within the claimed colony.That the word itself supplied the legal act by which allegiance, nationality or sovereignty was acquired.

The obedience clause is still a major assertion of jurisdiction

The distinction does not make the clause insignificant. The Charter expressly commanded “all other the Inhabitants” to obey, aid and assist the Governor. Contemporary judicial material later treated this kind of Great Seal clause as part of the legal force of the Governor’s commission and Charter.

But the direction operates on a prior premise: that the Crown was entitled to constitute the territory as its colony and command the people within it. The Charter does not separately obtain consent from each class of inhabitants. It proceeds from the sovereignty claim already made in May 1840 and builds governmental authority on top of it.

Jurisdiction pointThe Charter is evidence of the Crown asserting jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the claimed colony. The word “inhabitants” does not independently prove the earlier acquisition of sovereignty that the Charter assumes.

What about Article 3 of the Treaty?

The English Treaty text says the Queen extended royal protection to the “Natives of New Zealand” and imparted to them “all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects”. The Māori text uses a different formulation, promising protection and “nga tikanga katoa rite tahi” with the people of England.

That provision is part of the Crown’s case for Māori status within the British constitutional order. But even here, it is important to separate the promise of rights and privileges from the later statutory declaration of natural-born subject status.

1865 exposes that the status question was not administratively trivial

The Native Rights Act 1865 is especially revealing. Its preamble states that doubts had been raised whether certain persons of the Māori race were natural-born subjects of the Queen and whether the Queen’s courts had jurisdiction in all cases touching Māori persons and property.

Section 2 then declared that every person of the Māori race within the colony, whether born before or after New Zealand became a dependency of Great Britain, was to be taken and deemed a natural-born subject of the Queen. Section 3 expressly declared the jurisdiction of the colonial courts over Māori persons, property and customary land questions.

What this proves

By 1865 Parliament considered the matter sufficiently uncertain to require an express statutory declaration removing doubts about both subject status and court jurisdiction.

What it does not prove

It does not prove that Māori only became British subjects in 1865. The Act is framed as declaratory and retrospective: people born before the dependency were also “taken and deemed” natural-born subjects.

What remains important

The statute confirms that status, territorial inhabitancy and court jurisdiction were legally distinct questions, even if British law ultimately connected them.

British common law supplied another doctrinal bridge

British colonial common law historically treated inhabitants of territory acquired by conquest or cession as coming under the new sovereign’s protection and, in that legal system, becoming subjects rather than remaining enemies or aliens. That doctrine is associated with Campbell v Hall and later continuity jurisprudence.

This matters because it identifies the Crown-law mechanism more precisely. The legal argument was not necessarily: “the Charter used the word inhabitants, therefore every inhabitant became a subject.” It was closer to: “sovereignty has been acquired; British law therefore attaches consequences to the inhabitants of the acquired territory.”

That takes us straight back to the constitutional hinge identified in Part 28: if the status and jurisdiction consequences depend on the acquisition of sovereignty, the underlying question remains how that acquisition was legally established and how its scope related to what rangatira actually agreed.

Finding 38

Finding 38In the 1840 Charter, “inhabitants” is a broader territorial category than “subjects”. The instrument separately refers to Crown subjects resident in the colony, Aboriginal Natives, and all other inhabitants. Later naturalisation laws confirm that some people could reside in the colony while remaining aliens, so residence or inhabitancy was not identical to British subject status. The Charter nevertheless commands all inhabitants to obey the Governor, demonstrating the Crown’s asserted territorial jurisdiction. Māori subject status and court jurisdiction were later made express in the Native Rights Act 1865, whose preamble itself records that doubts had existed. The strongest legal reading is therefore not that the word “inhabitants” itself converted Māori into British subjects, but that British law treated subjecthood and jurisdiction as consequences of the Crown’s claimed acquisition of sovereignty — the very acquisition whose source this series is auditing.

The next question is now unavoidable: if Māori were not simply converted into subjects by being called “inhabitants”, what exact legal doctrine was said to make them natural-born subjects from 1840 — and did that doctrine depend on cession, conquest, settlement, or some combination the New Zealand courts later treated as constitutionally closed?

Primary, statutory and legal sources

DigitalNZ — original 1840 Charter record ↗

Papers Past / AJHR 1873 — reproduction of the 1840 Charter provisions ↗

Victoria University of Wellington — R v Clarke and the Great Seal “inhabitants” clause ↗

Manatū Taonga / NZHistory — English Treaty text, Article 3 ↗

New Zealand Legislation — Naturalization Act 1845 ↗

New Zealand Legislation — Native Rights Act 1865 ↗

University of Auckland — colonial common-law continuity and Campbell v Hall ↗

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